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Abstract. A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their abil-
ity to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this issue within
the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where
each agent plays with its local neighbors, collects an aggregate payoff and imitates the strat-
egy of its best neighbor. We allow the agents to adapt their local neighborhood according to
their satisfaction level and the strategy played. We show that a steady state is reached, where
the strategy and network configurations remain stationary. While the fraction of cooperative
agents is high in these states, their average payoff is lower than the one attained by the de-
fectors. The system self-organizes in such a way that the structure of links in the network
is quite inhomogeneous, revealing the occurrence of cooperator “leaders” with a very high
connectivity, which guarantee that global cooperation can be sustained in the whole network.
Perturbing the leaders produces drastic changes of the network, leading to global dynamical
cascades. These cascades induce a transient oscillation in the population of agents between
the nearly all-defectors state and the all-cooperators outcome, before setting again in a state
of high global cooperation.
1 Introduction
In the agent-based models used in Social Sciences, Economy and Political Economy, agents
interact directly with one another, and a social macrostructure emerges from these interac-
tions. The implications of these models are easily studied with computer simulations. In this
computational approach it is very natural to implement a network of interactions among the
agents [9]. In addition, such computer simulations permit to study the dynamical evolution of
the social structures.
In this context, an important question that is being addressed in a number of ways is how
the aggregate or global behavior emerges from the individual characteristics of the agents.
A particular aspect of this question is to understand if the global behavior is determined
by average commonly found agents or if a few individual distinct agents can have a strong
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influence in the emerging macrostructure. In the latter case such special agents play the role
of social leaders. Generally speaking, the influence of each agent depends on the network
of interactions with other agents, an interaction being represented by a link between two
agents. These interactions can be restricted to a set of agents placed in neighboring sites of a
regular spatial lattice, can reach arbitrary agents as in a random network or can occur through
intermediate “small-world” networks [17]. In most cases, this network of interactions is fixed
and given from the outset. However, it is natural to consider situations in which the network
of interactions evolves dynamically adapting itself to the emerging global structure.
In this paper we tackle the problem of how cooperation arises in a dynamically evolv-
ing network of agents. The network adaptation allows the emergence of an asymptotic state
dominated by those special agents which in the course of the dynamical evolution are able to
establish a much larger number of links than the average agent.
The paradigm to study the emergence of cooperation has been the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) game. Using evolutionary game theory [18], it was shown [3,2] that cooperation may be
sustained by a population of agents meeting repeatedly through global random interactions.
Two agents interact playing the game and, according to their outcome, their strategies are
allowed to evolve. A second route to cooperative behavior, pioneered by Nowak and May 1,
comes from the consideration of “spatial games”. In these games every individual interacts
only with a given subset from the whole population (e.g. the neighbors). The neighbors are
defined by a fixed network of interactions. The spatial network can promote the emergence of
cooperation in situations in which global non-cooperative behavior results if the interactions
were random and homogeneous. Here we also consider a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
The novelty is that the group of agents with which a given one interacts adapts endogenously
during the dynamical evolution. The adaptation of the network builds up cooperation.
In our computer simulation of the game we implement two dynamical rules. The first one
is an action update: At each time step, each agent plays the same strategy cooperate (C) or
defect (D) with all its local neighbors. Then the agents revise their individual strategies and
imitate the neighbors strategy with highest aggregate payoff. Only a few agents will be found
to be satisfied and will keep their strategy. The second rule is the network update: Unsatisfied
agents are allowed to change their local neighborhood. Specifically, we let defectors break
with a certain probability any link with other defectors, and replace them with new neigh-
bors selected randomly from the whole network. The motivation behind this rule is that two
defectors playing a PD game would certainly prefer to change its neighbor in order to find a
cooperator from whom to ‘exploit’ a better payoff.
The results of our simulations show that the network of agents reaches a steady state
with a high degree of cooperative behavior. The fraction of agents that cooperate depends
only slightly on the incentive to defect in the individual game. This behavior contrasts with
previous studies on “spatial” PD games where partial cooperation was reached, but it was
observed that the fraction of agents which are cooperators strongly decreases as the incen-
tive to defect is increased. This feature results from the adaptation of the network and it is
reflected in the non-homogeneous structure that it reaches during the dynamical evolution.
We will show that the process of “searching” cooperative neighbors performed by defectors,
results in the emergence of a leader agent, defined as the cooperator with the largest number
of links with other agents in the network. When the leader is not the wealthiest (i.e., the one
with largest payoff), the network is in an unstable situation and, depending on the parameter
1 See for e.g. [14,11,10,6,15]. A cellular automata representation with several learning rules
is presented in Ref. [8]. For an extensive study of the dynamics of a PD game with different
strategies, evolution of the strategies and different networks see Ref. [4].
Cooperation, adaptation and leadership 3
  measuring network adaptation, recurrent global cascades may be observed. These cascades
induce large oscillations in the fraction of agents which are cooperators, together with a large
reorganization of the network. In most cases, a final state with a high degree of cooperation
is reached. We have also tested the robustness of such cooperative state. We find that a per-
turbation (spontaneous change of strategy) on a non-leader usually results in a short transient
dynamics returning to the steady state. However, when a leader is perturbed, global cascades
may be observed in the system before a state with a high degree of cooperation is recovered.
This identifies the importance of the highly-connected agents which play the role of social
leaders in the collective dynamics of the system.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section defines the spatial version of the PD
game in an adaptive network. Section 3 describes our numerical results on the emergence of
cooperation. In Section 4 we discuss the evolution of the network and the emergence of the
”leader” agents. Finally in Section 5, we summarize our results.
2 Spatial Prisoners Dilemma in an adaptive network
We consider the following framework:  agents sit in the nodes of an adaptive network
 where the links define their neighborhoods. Each agent plays a PD game only with those
other agents directly connected by one link. In this paper, we will restrict ourselves to the case
of bidirectional or undirected links, and interactions to first neighbors. Indirect interactions
with neighbors’ neighbors have been studied for example in [5,16,7]. Thus, two agents are
neighbors if they are directly connected by one link. We define the neighborhood of agent 
as the subset of  which are neighbors of , and we represent it as neigh(); its cardinal is


. The coordination number, , of a network with  nodes and 

links is defined as the
average number of links per node
  
 

 



 



 (1)
In this paper we consider random networks  with coordination number  formed by dis-
tributing 

   links between pairs of nodes  	, with the constraint that  	  
	  (bidirectional links). The resulting distribution of the number of links in the network is
Poissonian with the maximum located at the coordination number .
We denote by 


      the strategy of agent  at time step , where 


   corre-
sponds to play cooperation (C), and 


   corresponds to defection (D), and will be referred
to as C-agents or D-agents, respectively. The payoff matrix for a 2-agent PD game is shown
in Table 1, where it is standard to take     Æ   and   .
Table 1. Prisoners Dilemma payoff matrix
C D
C    
D   Æ Æ
We consider the situation in which agents seek the largest possible benefit from their
local interactions in the network  . We assume each agent plays the same strategy with all its
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neighbors neigh(), and the strategy is updated by all the agents at the same time; synchronous
update. The time evolution is as follows:
1. Each agent  plays the PD game with each neighbor using the same strategy 


and
collecting a total individual payoff 

,


  




   


 

 

 

Æ  (2)
where 

is the number of links of agent  and 

is the number of neighbors of agent 
that are C-agents.
2. Agent  revises its current strategy at each iteration of the game (i.e. at every time step),
and updates it by imitating the strategy of its neighbor with a highest pay-off. Agent  is
said to be satisfied if it has the largest pay-off in his neighborhood. Otherwise it will be
unsatisfied and it will revise its strategy.
3. Network Rule: each agent may adapt its local neighborhood:
if agent  is an unsatisfied D-agent then with probability   breaks a link with a D-
neighbor  neigh(), and replace it with a new agent  uniformly from  .
This scheme leads to a time evolution of the structure of the whole network, but the
coordination number  remains constant: for each unsatisfied D-agent , it will replace (on
average) 

 

  D-neighbors by new neighbors randomly chosen for the whole set, and
thus its local coordination number, 

, will not change; however, the replaced D-agents will
lose one link and the new selected ones will gain one link.
The network rule justification is based on the assumption that given two D-agents playing
a PD game, if they are unsatisfied, then they would prefer to exchange D-neighbors with the
hope of finding a new C-neighbor from whom to exploit a much better individual payoff. This
effectively amounts to ascribe a “searching” capability to D-agents. In our proposed setting
the searching is not optimized, in the sense that the searching is random, so D-agents taking
its chance to improve its payoff may end up with a new C-neighbor with a larger payoff,
forcing it to replicate this new strategy in the next time step. In the same spirit, one could
think that cooperators would also have a preference to break links with other D-agents. We
prefer to keep this asymmetry in roles so that D-agents may be described as being competitive
in nature, while C-agents remain conservative2.
The probability   is a measure of the adaptability of the network. Dynamically, this pa-
rameter acts effectively as a time scale for the evolution of the network. For      the network
does not evolve and remains fixed, while for        the evolution is very slow as the
adaptation takes over only after several trials. For     the adaptation is done at the same
speed as the game is being played. In other terms,   represents a transaction cost composed
of two parts: first, the cost of breaking an agreement and second, the cost of finding a new
partner and that this new partner accepts the agreement. One could separate these two costs,
and would have a process of breaking links (with a given probability ) and another process
of generation of links (with a probability ). However for the sake of simplicity we consider
these two processes as a single one.
We have also investigated other variations of the network adaptation rule. For example,
instead of breaking links with any of the unsatisfied D-neighbors, we also tested a rule which
allows an unsatisfied D-agent break with probability   solely the link with its D-neighbor with
largest pay-off. The qualitative results obtained with this adaptation rule are rather similar
[19].
It is worth making the following remarks:
2 In [1] agents may refuse to play with other agents irrespective of the strategy played.
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 Links between satisfied agents do not change, which it seems to be a reasonable assump-
tion.
 It is clear from the network adaptation rule, that not only D-agents may actively change
their neighborhood, but also C-agents will passively evolve their own set of players by
receiving new links from “searching” D-agents.
 In the present model, we do not take into account spontaneous creation or destruction of
links, therefore the total number of links in the network  is conserved.
 In a standard 2-agent Prisoner’s Dilemma game there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
(D,D). In a previous work [19], we considered a variation of the PD payoff matrix with
Æ   , for comparison with [14,11]. In this situation the 2-agent PD game has as pure
Nash equilibria either (C,D), (D,C) or (D,D). However the results in [14,11] indicate
that, at least for fixed regular network, no qualitatively difference is found in the spatial
games when using 	 Æ  .
In the next sections we present the results of computer simulations of the model de-
scribed above. We take as a free parameter the incentive to defect . We consider random
initial networks with coordination number     and    	 and several values of the
adaptability parameter  . We investigate, among others, the following statistical measures:
(i) the fraction of cooperators, that it, the fraction of agents which are C-agents, denoted by


  
 

 



 , (ii) the average payoff per agent     
 


 of the whole
network and the distribution of payoff, (iii) the probability of having a link between two C-
agents,  

, between a C-agent and a D-agent,  

, and between two D-agents,  

. These
probabilities satisfy:
    

  

  

 (3)
Throughout this work, the parameter  which controls the incentive to defect was varied
in the range     , while the other PD payoff matrix elements were fixed to Æ    and
   . Finally, if not otherwise stated, the network  consists of     agents, with
an initial fraction of 
 C-agents randomly distributed in the network.
Table 2. Average fraction of C-agents, 

, for different initial random networks, with and
without network adaptation. The results are averaged over 10 different initial conditions after
    time steps of evolution.
           	    	
                    
1.05 0.89 0.942 0.95 0.994
1.15 0.87 0.947 0.90 0.989
1.35 0.59 0.920 0.58 0.988
1.55 0.31 0.900 0.38 0.988
1.75 0.09 0.885 0.03 0.983
1.95 0.04 0.889 0.01 0.962
3 Cooperation enhancement in an adaptive network
The PD game with local interactions in non-adaptive (    ) regular lattices, has been previ-
ously studied in Refs. [14,15,13]. These studies showed how partial cooperation can be sus-
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tained due to the local interactions, in spite of memory-less strategies. Several extensions to
this spatial model have been studied in the literature. For example, introducing asynchronous
updates [6] or introducing errors in the imitation process [12], the basic results persist [13].
For comparison with the adaptive network considered below, we give in Table 2 some
numerical results for a fixed (    ) random network. Such network is our initial condi-
tion for the adaptive network. We see that the average fraction of C-agents decreases with
an increasing value of the incentive to defect . Notice that depending on the characteristic
coordination number , there is a critical      such that for larger values of  the system
reaches a state of all D-agents. That is, for     partial cooperation is supported in these
networks. We obtain for    	 a critical   
 . The numerical results also show that
increasing the average size of the neighborhood (average number of links per agent, ) the
average number of C-agents 

decreases faster with .
When the network is able to adapt with the outcome of the individual games, either the
dynamics settles onto a steady state after some transient time, or the system reaches a full
defect state where all the agents are playing D and the network is continuously evolving. To
compare the asymptotic dynamics of the fraction of cooperators between the adaptive and
non-adaptive case, we illustrate in Fig. 1 a time series of 

evolving for     
in a fixed network (    ), and then for      with a fully adaptive network
(    ). We observe that the fraction of cooperators increases as the adaptation is turned on.
Table 2 illustrates this behavior for other values of . We conclude that the network adaptation
enhances a highly cooperative network. Also notice that in the non-adaptive case, the fraction
of cooperators fluctuates slightly, while in the adaptive case a steady state is reached.
It is important to notice that in order to obtain the above results, the initial fraction of co-
operators in the network has to be sufficiently large. In all our numeric computations we took
an initial fraction of 
 of C-agents, which proved to be a good number for the coordi-
nation numbers studied. This was also noticed in previous spatial games and reflects the fact
that the cooperative strategy will replicate throughout the network, only if (the approximate)
average payoff of C-agents is larger than the one of D-agents. We will show below that in
some circumstances, perturbations of the network may destroy the cooperative outcome and
lead to a full defective network. Such asymptotic state is a dynamical state, since the network
is continuously adapting but never finding a C-agent to exploit.
The steady state found in the adaptive network corresponds to a stationary network struc-
ture and to a stationary configuration of strategies. When the system reaches a steady state,
there are necessarily no links between D-agents, thus  

   (see Fig. 1(b)), except in
the unlikely case of having exactly the same aggregate payoff. Also, in general we have that
 

  . Therefore, the steady state is composed by a collection of cooperators exploited
by D-agents.
We define a chain of cooperators, as a connected component in  of sites occupied by
cooperators in which each cooperator except the last one is linked to a neighboring cooperator
with larger pay-off. All cooperators in the chain except the last one are actually unsatisfied,
but as they imitate the same strategy they were playing on the previous step, they never change
their relative payoff. When the system reaches a steady state ( 

  ), the only possibility
for D-agents is to exploit the agents of a given chain and must necessarily be satisfied. In
terms of payoff we say that D-agents are “passive” local maxima, in the sense that they have
the maximum payoff in their neighborhood but nobody is imitating their strategy. In summary,
every cooperator chain should satisfy the following ordering in terms of payoff:


 

 

   neigh() (4)
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Fig. 1. (a) Time series of the fraction of cooperative agents 

and average payoff  of the
whole network. For      the network is fixed     , while for     
the network is fully adapting     . (b) Corresponding time series of the different links
probabilities: two C-agents ( 

), a C and a D-agent ( 

), and two D-agents ( 

) having
a link. (c) Distribution of D-D-links, C-C-links, D-C-links and C-D-links for the steady state.
(   ,    	).
where  is a C-agent imitating from C-agent , and  is an exploiting D-agent of . It is
clear that the number of different steady states which one can construct satisfying eq. (4) is
huge for a fair number of agents  .
Finally, another salient feature of our cooperative network model is the inhomogeneous
distribution of payoff for each subpopulation, which differs substantially from the non-adaptive
network case. Figure 2 displays such distributions (normalized to the number of individuals
in each subpopulation), and reveals that although defectors are outnumbered by cooperators,
on average they are wealthier. This is an interesting result, which indicates that, in the long
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run, the searching capability of the D-agents rewards them. This behavior is observed sys-
tematically in the parameter regime      for    	.
The above result seems surprising from the point of view of the traditional replication
dynamics [18] used in evolutionary game theory, because one could conclude from Fig. 2 that
D-agents should dominate the whole population. But our results indicate that the final highly
cooperative state is not determined by average agents in the system, but rather by a small
subset of those maximally connected C-agents. In the next section we discuss the important
role played by these cooperative leaders, defined as those C-agents with the largest number
of links.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of individual payoff for each subpopulation (C and D-agents) in a final
equilibrium state (normalized to each subpopulation). (a)    , (b)    . (    ,
   	).
4 Dynamics of network evolution and emergence of leaders
The network rule allows for the evolution of the connectivity of every agent and permits that
the network reaches a steady state. The distribution of links in this steady state displays the
heterogeneous structure of the network. Figure 1(c) shows the distribution of links between
two C-, D-, and between D-C and C-D agents. Notice the broad band distribution of links
between two C-agents, which may reach as 5 times the average connectivity of the network.
Defectors, on the other hand, are shown to be connected only to C-agents, and have a narrow
distribution centered at .
The tail of the distributions of links identifies a very small number of C-agents with a
large number of links to other C-agents We define the C-agent with the maximum number
of links as the leader. In a steady state this agent should be satisfied and leading a chain of
cooperators. The number of C-agents which can fit on a given chain connected to the leader
may be huge.
We have calculated the number of links of the leader agent for different values of the
incentive to defect  in a steady state. Table 3 gives a measure of the connectivity of the leader,
labeled , compared with the number of links of the most connected D-agent labeled  (recall
that all connections are exploiting other C-agents), with their corresponding payoffs. Notice
that for increasing  the number of links of the leader increases while it remains essentially
constant for the defector with largest number of links.
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Table 3. Maximum number of links of the leader agent (

), the D-agent with a largest
number of links (
	
), and corresponding payoffs (

, 
	
) for different values of  in a
steady state. The results are averaged over 30 different initial conditions,    	 and     .
 


	



	
1.15 25.8 11.2 25.8 12.9
1.35 40.5 11.7 40.5 15.8
1.55 54.1 11.8 54.1 18.3
1.75 56.9 13.0 56.9 22.8
1.95 72.1 14.0 72.1 27.4
The leader agent leads the cooperative collective state of the system in several ways.
On one hand, the leader favors the creation of chains of cooperators. On the other hand,
and provided there are links between D-agents, leaders are selected through the dynamics
of the adapting network, and are a direct consequence of the “searching” done by D-agents.
Consider for example a D-agent 	 which exchanges one of its D-neighbors with the leader
. Assume that 

 


. In the next time step the D-agent will become a cooperator by
imitation and


    

   (5)
Whenever the payoff of the leader is the largest payoff in the whole network its connectivity
increases as described by (5).
However, an unstable situation occurs whenever the leader does not have the largest
payoff in the whole network. If the leader  receives a D-neighbor with a larger payoff, in the
subsequent time steps a drastic event happens, for   and its associated chain will imitate
the D-strategy. If after this cascading imitation there are C-agents left in the network, a new
leader with a fewer number of links will be selected; otherwise a full defective network may
be reached. This indicates the sensibility of the network structure to small perturbations on in-
dividual specially well-connected agents: A local event associated with a particular individual
propagates in macrodynamical avalanches into the full network.
The phenomenon described above does not exclude the possibility that a D-agent 	 selects
a C-agent which would satisfy (4), allowing agent 	 to become a passive local maximum and
exploit the C-agent. In fact, it is by this mechanism that D-agents also increase their payoff.
We have performed several computer simulations to visualize the dynamic evolution of
the network which we have just discussed. Each panel of Fig. 3 shows a comparison of the
payoff of the leader  with the payoff of the D-agent with largest payoff (labeled 3), together
with the evolution of the fraction of cooperators in the network.
For small values of the adaptability parameter  , as shown in panel (a), the typical time
for the network to reach a steady state is very large, and the leader  increase its connectivity
via (5) very slowly. The fraction of cooperators increases on average as the leader increases
its number of links. On the other hand for   
 , the typical time to reach a steady state is
very short (see Fig. 1), and in general the leader is always the wealthiest agent of the whole
population.
3 We remark that at every time step a different D-agent may become the agent  with largest
pay-off. This is a consequence of the competitive nature of D-agents in contrast to the
conservative nature of C-agents.
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Fig. 3. Time series of 

and a re-scaled payoff of the cooperator leader (

) and the D-
agent with maximum payoff (

). (a)     ,    , (b)     ,    , (c)
    ,     (   	).
An interesting intermediate regime occurs for   
  and high incentive to defect ,
where a competition between the cooperative leader and the most wealthy defector arises. In
this regime the number of links of the leader does not grow so fast and defectors may get a
significant large payoff due to the high value of . Panel (b) and (c) illustrates this situation. It
is seen that there are time intervals in which the leader is not wealthier than the D-agent  with
largest payoff. Whenever this event occurs, large global cascades involving a large fraction of
the whole population are observed, with a significant fraction of the whole population being
affected. The initial dropout of the fraction of cooperators affects immediately the payoff of
exploiting D-agents and 

reaches a minimum approximately when the leader  becomes
once again the wealthiest agent in the network. Once this stable situation is re-established,
the leader may again increase its number of links until all D-agents have links exclusively
with other C-agents ( 

  ).
An extreme example is observed in panel (c) at  
 , where the network is composed
of mostly D-agents together with a very wealthy leader. The leader is able to increases its
number of links by the intense (unsuccessful) “searching” done by D-agents, and by  
 
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the fraction of cooperators also increases. This recovery shows the importance of a wealthy
leader, which enables a full cooperative final outcome. Another situation worth mentioning
is that whenever strong competition between the leader and the wealthiest D-agent occurs,
there is a possibility that the system ends in a full defective network. This is what is shown
happens in panel (b) of Fig. 3. We remark that provided the initial fraction of C-agents is
large, the full defective network is rarely reached for high enough  .
The above results show that the dynamic evolution of the network is intimately related
to the fate of the leader. Another possible test, is to study how noise affects the network dy-
namics. If the noise is in the form of selecting a random agent and spontaneously changing
its strategy, then the dominance of C-leaders is found to remain for nearly the whole range of
    , for a sufficiently small noise intensity. However when the probability of a spon-
taneous change of strategy is increased, we find that a transition to the full defective network
becomes more probable4. Clearly the leader may suffer such perturbations, and induce large
cascades in the system. If such drastic perturbations have a small probability, the system has
time to reach the cooperative outcome before the new leader is knocked down again. The
simulation described in Fig. 4 illustrates how the system reaches a steady state at  
 	,
and a spontaneous change of strategy was applied to the leader: large cascades results and a
final cooperative outcome is again recovered. The transient oscillations observed in Fig. 4 at
 
  before a steady state is reached, as well as the ones originated by the change of strat-
egy of the leader constitute a Sysiphus effect. The drop in the fraction of cooperators comes
together with a large increase of  

. Thanks to its adaptability, the network reacts creating
more C-C links. However the attempts to build up a large cooperative behavior are not always
successful and the system goes through oscillations in which non-cooperative behavior with
large values of  

is recovered. The frustrated attempts to build cooperation indicate that
for cooperation to be robust, it has be built upon a specific networks of links. In the frustrated
attempts to reach a collective stable cooperative state, the fraction of cooperators becomes
large, but the spatial arrangement of links in the network is not the proper one.
5 Discussion
We have introduced a model of cooperation on an adaptive network, where cooperation is
highly enhanced with respect to the situation of a fixed network. The network adaptation in-
volves exclusively the D-agents, which in some sense are allowed to “search” for new neigh-
bors, in the hope of finding C-agents to be exploited. Our study shows that this mechanism
leads to a global cooperative state of the network. The asymptotic state reached by the system
is a steady state in which the network structure and the average payoff per agent  remains
stationary. However, most agents are unsatisfied, and continuously imitate the strategy of their
neighbors with highest payoff (most of them C-agents). The structure of the network can be
understood in terms of chains of cooperators with D-agents exploiting some cooperators.
The network adaptation that we have implemented in our spatial game gives rise to the
emergence of a leader, a cooperator with maximum number of connections. Whenever the
leader is the wealthiest agent in the network, and defectors are still “searching”, the leader
may increase its number of links with other cooperators. However, if some defector becomes
wealthier than the leader, an unstable situation occurs and large global cascades may take
4 In fact a full defective network is reached for     , where the critical    depends on
the noise intensity.
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Fig. 4. Time series of 

, where at     the leader agent changes strategy from C to D.
Parameter values:    ,    	,     .
place. Such cascades can also be induced if “noise” in the form of spontaneous change of the
strategy is allowed.
We finally note that the dynamics described above cannot be explained in terms of av-
erage agents. In the final mostly cooperative state the average wealth of defectors is larger
than the average cooperators wealth. The final collective state is dominated by rare individu-
als which build-up cooperation in the whole population because they have a number of links
which is far from the average.
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